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The point of judicial recusal is at once obvious and elusive.  The idea of a 
partial judge immediately grates on our sense of fairness.  Almost invariably, 
the normative basis of judicial impartiality is traced to what is described as 
‘natural justice’;1 specifically the celebrated maxims of nemo iudex in causa 
sua2 and audi alteram partem.3  But the relationship of this moral bedrock to 
the exigencies and settled practices of constitutional adjudication is far from 
straightforward.  This article will focus on the implications of the latter 
principle – perhaps best translated as a standard of judicial open-mindedness 
regarding the subject matter of a dispute.  Despite its moral immediacy, there 
are serious theoretical objections, best described as ‘realist,’ to an expansive 
conception of judicial open-mindedness.  Likewise, at a practical level, the 
institution of the dissenting opinion can be seen as diluting the duty to keep an 
open mind, at least in jurisdictions such as the US where judges are expected 
to exhibit relatively little deference towards previous decisions in which they 
were outvoted.  
The issue of judicial impartiality was placed in sharp relief by the recent 
controversy surrounding US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
extrajudicial commentary on legal questions relating to a then pending 
Supreme Court case, Hamdan v Rumsfeld.4  In Part I, the article will proceed 
with a doctrinal analysis of the legality of Justice Scalia’s decision to sit in the 
∗ Balliol College, Oxford.  I assisted in the preparation of Binyam Mohamed’s amicus 
curiae brief to the Supreme Court in support of the Petitioner in the Hamdan case.  
The brief related solely to the merits of the petition.  I am grateful to Ravinder 
Thukral, Greg Ó Ceallaigh and the Denning reviewers for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper, and to David Whelan for directing me to some interesting 
case law.  The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 As in the Scottish case of Bradford v McLeod [1986] SLT 244 where the Court, in 
grounding its standard of judicial impartiality, declared it was ‘entirely satisfied that 
what are commonly referred to as the rules of natural justice apply to criminal trials in 
this country.’ at 247.  See also the Commonwealth case of Kanda v Government of 
Malaya [1962] AC 322 at 337, ‘[t]hose two rules [the rule against bias and the right to 
be heard] are the essential characteristics of what is often called natural justice’ 
(Denning LJ).   
2 That no one be a judge in their own case. 
3 That one must listen to both sides. 
4 Supreme Court Docket No. 05-184; 126 S Ct 2749 (2006).   
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case notwithstanding his prior remarks.  Taking a broader perspective, Part II 
will consider whether objections to Justice Scalia’s participation in Hamdan 
can be reconciled with the nature of appellate adjudication and, in relation to 
dissenting opinions, with an established feature of adjudicative practice in 
most common law jurisdictions. 
 
PART I: HAMDAN AND THE LAW OF RECUSAL 
 
Section A: Swiss Judicial Neutrality 
 
During a Q&A session on March 8th of last year at the University of 
Freiburg in Switzerland, Justice Scalia noted his astonishment at “the world 
reaction to Guantanamo,” and declared that “[w]ar is war, and it has never 
been the case that when you capture a combatant you have to give them a jury 
trial in your civil courts.”5  Challenged as to the justice of incarcerating an 
individual in Guantanamo Bay without having proven their guilt, Scalia 
interjected, “If he was captured by my army on a battlefield, that is where he 
belongs.  I had a son on that battlefield and they were shooting at my son and 
I’m not about to give this man who was captured in a war a full jury trial.  I 
mean it’s crazy.”  When the questioner suggested a role for the Geneva 
Conventions in the matter, Scalia asked “What do they mean?” and answered, 
“They mean almost anything.” 
It is difficult to imagine Justice Scalia being oblivious to the Hamdan 
case6 when making these remarks.7  Oral argument in the Supreme Court was 
5 A video of the Justice’s speech is available at http://bafweb.com/index.php?s=scalia  
6 Hamdan’s facts, as had been found by the Court of Appeal (DC Circuit), were that 
Afghani militia forces captured the petitioner in Afghanistan in late November 2001.  
His captors turned him over to the American military, which transported him to the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba.  The military initially kept him in the general 
detention facility, known as Camp Delta.  On July 3, 2003, the President determined 
‘that there is reason to believe that [Hamdan] was a member of al Qaeda or was 
otherwise involved in terrorism directed against the United States.’  Hamdan was 
designated for trial before a military commission.  In April 2004, Hamdan filed a 
petition for habeas corpus.  While his petition was pending before the district court, 
the government formally charged Hamdan with conspiracy to commit attacks on 
civilians and civilian objects, murder and destruction of property by an unprivileged 
belligerent, and terrorism.  In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi v 
Rumsfeld 124 S Ct 2633 (2004), Hamdan received a formal hearing before a 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal.  The tribunal affirmed his status as an enemy 
combatant for whom continued detention was required.  On November 8, 2004, the 
district court granted in part Hamdan’s petition. Among other things, the court held 
that Hamdan could not be tried by a military commission unless a competent tribunal 
determined that he was not a prisoner of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention 
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less than three weeks away and it was clear to any informed observer that the 
case had the potential to have enormous implications for the Bush 
Administration’s approach to bringing its Guantanamo captives to justice.8  In 
response to Justice Scalia’s comments, a request for his recusal was filed on 
March 27 by one of Hamdan’s amici curiae, ‘Retired Generals’.9  Ignoring 
this request, Justice Scalia proceeded to take part in oral argument10 and 
subsequently dissented from the Court’s reversal of the Court of Appeals’ 
decision to deny Hamdan relief.11  
 
governing the treatment of prisoners.  The court therefore enjoined the Secretary of 
Defense from conducting any further military commission proceedings against 
Hamdan.  The district court’s decision was reversed by the court of appeal on July 15, 
2005.  The questions for which Hamdan was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court 
were: 1. Whether the military commission established by the President to try 
petitioner and others similarly situated for alleged war crimes in the ‘war on terror’ is 
duly authorized under Congress's Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
(AUMF); the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); or the inherent powers of the 
President?  2. Whether petitioner and others similarly situated can obtain judicial 
enforcement from an Article III court of rights protected under the 1949 Geneva 
Convention in an action for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of their 
detention by the Executive branch? 
7 For instance, in an essay by Adam Cohen published in the New York Times on 
April 3, 2006 (which did not refer to any recusal issue) Hamdan was described as 
‘probably the term’s most important case.’  The following day, the paper’s editorial 
board described the case as ‘momentous’. On March 28, the Washington Post 
described Hamdan as ‘one of the most important terrorism-related cases to reach the 
court.’  Likewise, on February 7, Hamdan received prominent mention in a speech on 
comparative law by Justice Scalia’s colleague, Justice Ginsburg.  Hamdan was the 
only case on the Supreme Court docket referred to by Ginsburg.  Indeed according to 
the Philadelphia Inquirer editorial of March 31, Justice Scalia himself told his 
Freiburg audience that he was ‘‘only weeks away from sitting in judgment on 
Osama’s former wheelman.’’ 
8 Evidence of Hamdan’s importance could be found in the number of its amici curiae 
– a total of 53 briefs were filed. 
9 The amicus’ letter is viewable at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/HamdanRecusalLetter.pdf  
10 The case was argued on March 28. 
11 Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion dealt solely with the question of whether the 
Court had jurisdiction to hear Hamdan’s petition, and concluded that it did not.  The 
argument might thus be made that any prejudicial view which the Justice may have 
entertained regarding the substance of Hamdan’s petition would ultimately have been 
irrelevant to his disposition of the case.  One sufficient reason for considering this 
argument unsustainable, however, is Justice Scalia’s joining of Justice Thomas’ 
dissenting opinion.  The Thomas dissent dealt in detail with the substance of each of 
the questions for which the Court had granted Hamdan certiorari. 
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The federal law regulating Justice Scalia’s participation in Hamdan 
provides, in relevant part, that:  
 
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United 
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following 
circumstances:  
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of 
relationship to either of them . . .:  
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be 
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 12
 
There were two potential grounds for Justice Scalia’s recusal.  The first 
was that the Justice had formed his opinion on the merits of Hamdan’s 
petition prior to hearing Hamdan’s arguments thereon and was thus unfit to 
decide the case due to prejudice.  The second had been his perception that his 
son was maliciously injured or endangered by battlefield detainees.  Justice 
Scalia’s remarks indicate he viewed this endangerment as relevant to the 
legality of a battlefield detainee’s treatment.  Thus it could be argued that “a 
person [within the first degree of relationship] was known by the judge to 
have an interest [in seeing his enemies held captive and/or brought to justice] 
that could have been substantially affected by the outcome of the 
proceeding,”13 to wit, whether battlefield detainee Hamdan could be tried 
under President Bush’s military commissions, as then constituted.  The first 
ground relates to the prejudgment of the substance of a case and is addressed 
by subsection (a); the second ground concerns personal interest bias and is 
dealt with by both (a) and (b)(5)(iii).  This article will focus on the first 
ground only. 
 
Section B: Subject Matter Prejudice 
 
Writing for the Supreme Court in one of its few opinions on subsection 
(a), Justice Scalia held that: 
 
[I]t was an entirely new ‘catch-all’ recusal provision, 
covering both ‘interest or relationship’ and ‘bias or prejudice’ 
. . . but requiring them all to be evaluated on an objective 
basis, so that what matters is not the reality of bias or 
12 Section 455 of Title 28, Part I, Chapter 21 of the US Code. 
13 Per Section 455 (b)(5). 
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prejudice, but its appearance. Quite simply and quite 
universally, recusal was required whenever ‘impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.’14  
 
As regards the question of subject matter prejudice, the history of the 
enactment of Section 455 happened to shed some light on Justice Scalia’s 
situation.  The subject of recusal had arisen in the Supreme Court’s 1972 
decision in Laird v Tatum.15  Laird involved a constitutional challenge to the 
Army’s surveillance of civilian political activity.  While serving in the 
Department of Justice prior to his elevation to the Supreme Court, William 
Rehnquist had commented on the proper application of the law to the facts of 
the Laird case, which was then pending in a lower court.16  The recusal issue 
in Laird was whether Rehnquist, having already articulated his views on the 
merits of the case, was prejudiced towards the Supreme Court arguments of 
one of its parties.  Rehnquist’s subsequent decision to sit in the case and 
provide the crucial fifth vote for the Army’s surveillance activities provoked 
controversy.  In response, the American Bar Association adopted a new 
cannon that required a judge to recuse himself whenever “his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.”17  In 1974, taking the cannon as its model, 
Congress enacted Section 455 with the stated goal of “promoting confidence 
in the impartiality of the judicial system.”18  It seems clear, therefore, that 
Section 455 (a) was enacted to prohibit Laird style non-recusals.19   
14 Liteky v US 510 US 540 (1994) at 548. 
15 408 US 1 (1972). 
16 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 92nd Cong, 1st Session, on ‘‘Federal Data 
Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights,’’ Part I, at 864-5 (1971). 
17 Cannon 3C (now Cannon 3E). 
18 HR REP NO 93-1453 (1974) at 2, 5.  This goal and the Congressional intention to 
conform with Cannon 3C was noted by the Supreme Court in Liljeberg v Health 
Services Acquisition Corp., 486 US 847 (1988) fn 7.  See further A Frost, ‘Keeping 
Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal’ 53 Kansas L Rev 
531, 545-547 (2005) and C L Roberts, ‘The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal 
and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort’ 57 Rutgers Law Review 107, 
138-143 (2004). 
19 Interestingly, when questioned on his decision not to recuse in Laird during his 
Senate confirmation hearings for the position of Chief Justice, Rehnquist remarked, 
‘‘I have gone back and read the opinion, and I think, under the statute as it was 
changed after Laird v Tatum, I think there would be probably a very strong ground for 
[my] disqualification.  But I didn’t feel dissatisfied with the way I had behaved under 
the statute as it then stood.’’  S Hrg 99-1067, p 184.  
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One difference between Laird and Hamdan suggests itself.  In his pre-case 
remarks, Rehnquist referred to Laird by name; whereas Justice Scalia did not 
mention Hamdan.  The difference lay in Justice Scalia’s favour, but was 
arguably insufficient to meet the post Laird standard of judicial impartiality 
introduced by Section 455.  To maintain that Scalia was any less partial 
towards Rumsfeld than Rehnquist was towards Laird, one must assume Scalia 
had not adverted his mind to Hamdan’s Supreme Court petition prior to 
holding forth on its subject matter.  Given the petition’s imminence and 
notoriety, this scenario appears implausible, especially in light of the 
remarkable perspicuity the Justice had demonstrated earlier in his Swiss 
remarks regarding a different ‘case.’  Asked about the constitutionality of 
restrictive abortion legislation that had recently been enacted by South 
Dakota,20 but which at that time was not even the subject of a lawsuit, Justice 
Scalia refused to answer.  Looking directly into the camera, the Justice noted 
that the case might wend its way up to the Supreme Court someday and that it 
would thus be inappropriate for him to pronounce upon it.21  
The Supreme Court has not elaborated a specific test for subject matter 
prejudice or bias under Section 455, but guidance can be drawn from its 
comments in Liteky regarding an ‘objective basis’ and its dictum in Liljeberg 
v Health Services Acquisition Corp. that “[t]he goal of section 455(a) is to 
avoid even the appearance of partiality.”22  This would suggest the 
appropriate test is whether there exists a reasonable apprehension of 
partiality.23  Let us therefore take the perspective of the reasonable man.  If he 
felt that Justice Scalia had simply been noting the historical precedent for the 
Executive’s proposals – rather than commenting on what rights a detainee 
should enjoy at trial – a reasonable observer might not have entertained 
doubts as to the Justice’s impartiality.  Were historical standards to mean little 
20 Signed into law by Governor Mike Rounds on March 6, 2006. 
21 See n 5.  The legislation in question was subsequently repealed by statewide 
referendum on November 7, 2006, without having been tested in federal court. 
22 486 US 847, 860 (1988).     
23 That the objective appearance of partiality is sufficient to warrant judicial recusal is 
likewise the position prevailing in several other common law jurisdictions.  See for 
instance Bradford v McLeod (n 1) at 247 (Scotland); Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield 
Properties Ltd [2000] HRLR 290 at 301, 314 (England and Wales) – cited 
approvingly in the Privy Council case of Diedrichs-Shurland v Talanga-Stiftung 
[2006] UKPC 58 paras 22-23; Bula Limited v Tara Mines Limited (No 6) [2000] 4 
I.R. 412, 449 (Ireland); Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 
para 6 (Australia); Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada [2003] 2 SCR 259, para 60 
(Canada); Auckland Casino Ltd. v Casino Control Authority [1995] 1 NZLR 142, 149 
(New Zealand); President of South Africa v South African Rugby Union Football 
(1999) (4) SA 149 paras 35-39.  See also Langborger v Sweden (1990) 12 EHRR 416, 
paras 32, 35 (European Court of Human Rights). 
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to Justice Scalia, that hypothesis might stand.  However, it is exceptionally 
rare for Justice Scalia to make an historical observation while discussing the 
constitutionality of a legal practice without employing that observation in the 
latter’s favour or vice versa.  As he made clear during his Swiss remarks, 
Justice Scalia is a committed originalist for whom statements such as ‘it has 
never been the case that when you capture a combatant you have to give them 
a jury trial in your civil courts’ could only ever function as a reason to deny 
such a trial.24  An objective observer would thus remain concerned that the 
Justice had already applied his theory of constitutional interpretation to the 
case at bar. 
Quite apart from Title 28, Justice Scalia’s conduct may raise 
constitutional questions.  In Re Murchison,25 the Supreme Court made an 
arguably analogous recusal decision based on the due process clause26 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The issue was whether a contempt proceeding 
complied with the due process requirements of an impartial tribunal where the 
judge presiding at the contempt hearing had also served as the ‘one-man grand 
jury’ out of which the contempt charges arose.  The Court held that: 
 
“[i]t would be very strange if our system of law permitted a judge to 
act as a grand jury and then try the very persons accused as a result of 
his investigations. . . Having been a part of that process a judge cannot 
be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction 
or acquittal of those accused.  While he would not likely have all the 
zeal of a prosecutor, it can certainly not be said that he would have 
none of that zeal.”27
 
It is not entirely clear whether the prejudice found in Murchison was that 
the judge had become emotionally committed to having his own decision to 
prefer charges vindicated as a matter of professional pride at the subsequent 
hearing or whether it lay in the judge bearing a disposition on the merits prior 
24 Justice Scalia has articulated his judicial philosophy in many public fora over the 
years.  One could go so far as to credit the Justice with putting ‘originalism’ on the 
international legal map. For an authoritative treatment see his ‘A Matter of 
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law’ (New Jersey; Princeton University Press 
1997). 
25 349 US 133 (1955). 
26 US Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, ‘‘No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.’’   
27 At 137. 
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to the hearing which would inevitably cloud his judgment thereof.  In the 
latter case, the Fourteenth Amendment was held to constitutionally enshrine a 
principle of judicial open-mindedness.  As such, Justice Scalia’s substantive 
comments on Hamdan’s position would place his judicial qualification to hear 
the latter’s petition under considerable pressure.  In the former case, 
Murchison could only be read as taking a strong line against the appearance in 
the judiciary of emotional commitment to a particular outcome, ‘prosecutorial 
zeal.’  But such a reading would have equally negative implications for a 
Justice’s decision to sit where he views one of the litigants as partially 
responsible for the malicious endangerment of his own son; endangerment he 
considers relevant to the issue of law at bar.  Thus on either construction of 
Murchison’s legal standard (or on a mélange of both), the Freiburg event 
implicated the question of recusal.  Moreover, the test applied to the due 
process clause by Murchison was as rigorous as that imputed by Liteky and 
Liljeberg to Section 455 (a), “our system of law has always endeavored to 
prevent even the probability of unfairness . . . to perform its high function in 
the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”28
On the analysis thus far, federal law appears to dictate recusal for 
prejudice as the appropriate course for Justice Scalia in Hamdan.  As it stands, 
however, that conclusion is not incontrovertible.  Likewise, we have yet to 
address a primary objection to the whole notion of judicial recusal – that 
judges are bound to have preconceived ideas about the law before they go into 
a case, many of which have been cogently expressed in their prior dissents.  
Fortunately, we are in a position to garner some guidance on these questions 
from Justice Scalia’s own record regarding the norms of subject matter 
prejudice. 
  
Section C: Justice Scalia’s Standards 
 
On January 12 2003, Scalia spoke in Fredericksburg, Virginia at an event 
sponsored by the Knights of Columbus. Remarking generally on the trend of 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence under the Establishment Clause, he 
criticised a decision of the Ninth Circuit on the wording of the Pledge of 
Allegiance.29  At the time he spoke, the Newdow case had been decided by a 
three-judge Ninth Circuit court of appeal panel, and was being considered for 
en banc rehearing.  On February 28, rehearing was denied. On April 30, the 
school district that lost the Newdow case filed for review by the Supreme 
Court, and on October 14 the Court granted review of the case.  It was argued 
28 At 136. 
29 See for instance the report of The Free Lance-Star at 
http://fredericksburg.com/News/FLS/911/2003/012003/01132003/846367 
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before the Supreme Court on March 24 2004.  Without comment, Justice 
Scalia recused himself from consideration of Newdow.30  In his memo 
explaining his refusal to disqualify himself from the Cheney case, he stated: 
 
“Recusal is the course I must take – and will take – when, on 
the basis of established principles and practices, I have said 
or done something which requires that course.  I have 
recused for such a reason this very Term. See Elk Grove 
Unified School District v  Newdow.”31
 
In substance, there does not appear to be any difference between Justice 
Scalia’s comments in relation to Newdow and his comments with regard to 
Hamdan.  Indeed, whereas Hamdan was on the Justice’s docket and only 
weeks from oral argument when he spoke in Freiburg, at the time of his 
comments in Fredericksburg, Newdow remained ten months from a Supreme 
Court decision.  Moreover, at that point, Newdow had not even worked its 
way out of the Court of Appeal and petition for certiorari would not be filed 
for a further 3 and half months.  It is true that Justice Scalia did not refer to 
Hamdan by name in Freiburg whereas he appears to have mentioned the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fredericksburg.  But as with the Laird analogy, it 
is difficult to believe the Justice was not adverting to the Hamdan case in 
making his comments, despite omitting to mention it by name. 
Consider the following extrajudicial response to a question asking 
whether different standards of judicial review should be applied under the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
 
“I just cannot do it [answer], and, I think the only way to be 
sure that I am not impairing my ability to be impartial, and to 
be regarded as impartial in future cases before the Court, is 
simply to respectfully decline to give an opinion on whether 
any of the existing law on the Supreme Court is right, or 
wrong.” 
 
When asked if the views expressed in a legal article he wrote four years 
before reflected his current views: 
 
“I do not think I should say. As far as a litigant who has to 
appear before me is concerned, it is troublesome enough to 
30 Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow 542 US 1. 
31 Cheney v US District Court 541 US (2004) Memorandum of Scalia J.  For an outline 
of the controversy regarding Justice Scalia’s qualification to sit in Cheney given his 
friendship with the Vice President see Frost (n 18) at 572-76. 
SCALIA, HAMDAN AND THE PRINCIPLES OF SUBJECT MATTER 
RECUSAL 
158 
                                                     
them, I suppose, that I once wrote views on one side or 
another like that, to reaffirm them after I am a sitting judge.”  
 
When questioned if Marbury v Madison32 was correctly decided: 
 
“I do not want to say that anything is a settled issue as far as I 
am concerned.  If somebody wants to come in and challenge 
Marbury v Madison, I will listen to that person. . . I really do 
not want to say with respect to any decision that I would not 
listen to a litigant who wants to challenge it.” 
 
A more uncompromising defence of judicial open-mindedness regarding 
the substance of future litigation would be hard to find.  The defence is that of 
Judge Antonin Scalia given in sworn testimony before the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary prior to his confirmation as Associate Justice of the US 
Supreme Court.33  A federal judge who is wary of making extrajudicial 
pronouncements on Madison v Marbury for fear of prejudicing an 
unidentifiable future litigant would surely baulk at the prospect of deciding an 
identifiable litigant’s fate having publicly dispatched the relevant legal 
question before hearing the litigant’s argument.  Of course, refusing to answer 
senatorial questions on the merits of any specific point of law (especially the 
most settled ones) enabled Judge Scalia to give a principled reason for 
declining to say where he stood on several hot button issues, most notably Roe 
v Wade.34  Indeed the fact that so many Senators accepted an appeal to 
judicial open-mindedness as reason enough for a judge to refuse to answer 
their questions suggests that the principle has considerable traction.35  In any 
32 5 US 137 (1803). 
33 S Hrg 99-1064 (August 5th 1986).  The quotes can be found at p 58, 59 and 83 
respectively. 
34 410 US 113 (1973). 
35 Justice Scalia was confirmed by a vote of 98-0.  During the hearings, when asked 
by Senator Edward Kennedy (amongst several others) whether he would overrule Roe 
v Wade, Scalia declined to answer.  At this point, the Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, Senator Strom Thurmond, intervened in support of the judge, stating at p 
37, ‘I agree with you.  I do not think it is proper to ask any question that he has to act 
on or may have to act on.’  Similarly, several members of the Judiciary Committee 
referred to the principle of judicial open-mindedness (in substance if not by name) in 
their official statements on Judge Scalia’s nomination.  See Thurmond at p 2, ‘a 
person who is open-minded;’ Hatch at p 15 ‘his openness to varied viewpoints,’ and 
‘judicial temperament;’ Denton at p 23, ‘a judge who eagerly seeks out the opinions 
and viewpoint of his fellow judges when he is formulating a position;’ DeConcini at p 
17, ‘judicial temperament;’ McConnell at 29, ‘judicial temperament;’ Leahy at p 20, 
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case, on the question of subject matter prejudice, both federal law and Justice 
Scalia’s own articulated standards suggest that, in Hamdan, recusal would 
have been the more appropriate course.36
The advisability of a Scalia recusal is confirmed by a clear line of federal 
Court of Appeals precedent to the effect that, where the “question of whether 
§455(a) requires disqualification is a close one, the balance tips in favor of 
recusal.”37  Moreover, as Chief Justice Roberts had already recused himself 
from the case,38 the commonly raised spectre of an equally divided court 
passively affirming the decision below could not apply in Hamdan.39  In 
relation to his Swiss remarks, the prospect of a 4-4 decision arose only by 
 
‘Your philosophy about the standards you would apply in recusing yourself from 
cases.’ 
36 Note I am not attempting to draw a parallel between the importance of a Justice’s 
testimony at his Supreme Court confirmation hearing and the lectures he may deliver 
at university settings.  Equally, I offer no view at this point as to whether Justice 
Scalia would have prejudiced himself had he answered questions concerning the 
correct state of the law at his confirmation hearings.  The point is simply to draw 
attention to the nature of the standards which Justice Scalia had himself proposed 
regarding the principle of judicial open-mindedness.     
37 Patterson v Mobil Oil Corp 335 F3d 476 CA 5 (Tex) 2003 at 484; In re Chevron 
USA., Inc 121 F.3d 163 CA 5 (Tex) 1997 at 165; Nichols v Alley 71 F3d 347 CA 10 
(Okl) 1995 at 352; US v Dandy 998 F2d 1344 CA 6 (Mich) 1993 at 1349; In re 
Boston's Children First 244 F.3d 164 CA 1, 2001 at 167; Republic of Panama v 
American Tobacco Co Inc 217 F3d 343 CA 5 (La) 2000 at 347.  This ‘tie-breaker’ 
consideration is also applicable in other common law jurisdictions, see for instance 
Locabail (n 23) at 304, ‘if in any case there is real ground for doubt, that doubt should 
be resolved in favour of recusal’ (England and Wales). 
38 Having participated in the Court of Appeal decision for which petitioner Hamdan 
had been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court.   
39 Cheney v US District Court 541 US (2004) Memorandum of Scalia J at II; Laird v 
Tatum 409 US 824 (1972) Memorandum of Rehnquist J at 837; Microsoft Corp v US 
121 S Ct 25 (2000) Memorandum of Rehnquist CJ at 27.  (The memoranda set out the 
respective Justices’ reasons for not considering themselves disqualified from sitting 
on the cases in question.)  See also Justice Ginsburg’s comment to this effect in ‘An 
Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’ 36 Conn L Rev 1033, 1038 
(2004).  According to Supreme Court practice, an equally divided court has the effect 
of affirming the decision under review without producing any precedential impact; 
see Eaton v Price 364 US 263 (1960).  However, recent empirical work by Lee 
Epstein and Ryan Black suggests that the fear of equal division on the Supreme Court 
is largely unfounded.  ‘Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally Divided Supreme 
Court’ 7 J Appellate Prac & Process 75 (2005) (finding that between the 1946 and 
2003 terms less than ten percent of impartiality recusals resulted in an equal division 
on the subsequent decision).  
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virtue of Justice Scalia’s decision to hear the case despite his apparent 
conclusions as to its merits.   
But whatever the doctrinal position regarding disqualification in this 
instance, broader concerns as to the plausibility of insisting on recusal for 
subject matter prejudice present themselves: is a subject matter dimension to 
the principle of audi alteram partem practical, or even coherent? 
 
PART II: THE LAW OF RECUSAL AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
 
Section A: The ‘Realist’ Objection  
 
There remains a cogent ‘realist’ objection to our subject matter analysis 
thus far, namely, that since judges will inevitably have fixed ideas about the 
law, penalising them for expressing those ideas off the bench, especially when 
they have already said as much in previous dissents, is arbitrary and 
nonsensical.  The principle of judicial open-mindedness is thus an illusion.  
To understand the limits of this point we need to consider the normative basis 
of subject matter impartiality and how it relates to the process of 
constitutional adjudication. 
Any legal system which takes positions on questions of morality or 
politics will necessarily place some of its litigants at a disadvantage.  Simply 
put, certain actors will find their activities closer to the right side of the law 
than others.40  Moreover, as regards constitutional bills of rights, the 
vagueness of the text inevitably invests those responsible for applying such 
bills with some law making capacity.41  This is evident when broadly worded 
provisions such as the First Amendment of the US Constitution42 or article 8 
of the ECHR43 are at issue – the range of textually coherent, alternative 
                                                     
40 That is, some litigants are more likely to win because they satisfy the substantive 
rules that the legal system has set out – a defendant who sells defectively dangerous 
goods in a jurisdiction which prohibits such activities is less likely to win the case 
than the plaintiff, however impartial the judge. 
41 Pace Ronald Dworkin, as in ‘No Right Answer?’ in P M S Hacker and J Raz (eds.) 
Law, Morality and Society. Essays in Honour of H L A Hart (Oxford; Clarendon 
1977). 
42  ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.’  
43 ‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
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outcomes is as wide as the range of factual scenarios arguably implicating 
those guarantees.  If the judge is to produce an outcome, she must make 
choices which define the legal content of those provisions.44
Likewise, to interpret a bill of rights, or any legal document, a judge needs 
a theory of interpretation.  If she had no such theory, she would have no 
means of recognising the meaningfulness of the texts with which she is 
presented.45  The choice of a theory of interpretation, though one bounded by 
what is politically possible, will inevitably have some impact on the kind of 
results she believes the legal texts require.46  Consequently, the necessity of 
choosing a theory of interpretation can be regarded as an investment of law 
making competence in those responsible for using the law to adjudicate 
disputes in the name of the jurisdiction.  Thus, between the openness of the 
text and the choices faced by judges in their selection of a theory for its 
interpretation, the application of a bill of rights requires some judicial 
creativity.  Put differently, to resolve ‘rights’ questions, judges must make 
some law.  Evidently, judges would find it impossible to make law (however 
little is necessary) without personal ideas as to what is morally and politically 
desirable.  Thus, as a qualified lawmaker, Justice Scalia is entitled to hold 
normative views about what the law should be and how it is to be determined. 
 Anyone with such views will find certain legal outcomes, such as the success 
or failure of Hamdan’s petition, more plausible than others.  In light of these 
interpretive realities, as between litigants, an inequality of legal arms is an 
inevitable feature of constitutional adjudication.  Unless we start resolving our 
lawsuits by rolling dice, we cannot expect our judges to be equally likely to 
find favour with the contending sides – quite apart from the inequalities of 
opportunity brought about by the unambiguous substantive content of the 
legal regime.  As such, there is no reason in principle for insisting that judges 
refrain from making normative statements in their public remarks.47  
                                                                                                                              
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’  
44 The point was well made by John P Frank, ‘Disqualification of Judges: In Support 
of the Bayh Bill’ 35 Law and Contemporary Problems 43 (1970) at 48 ‘Supreme 
Court Justices are strong-minded men, and on the general subject matters which come 
before them, they do have propensities; the course of decision cannot be accounted 
for in any other way.’ 
45 For an elaboration of this point see F Schauer ‘Precedent and Necessary Externality 
of Constitutional Norms’ 17 Harvard J Public Policy 45, 50-56 (1994).  
46 Different theories of the role of precedent, social science evidence, legislative 
intent, ‘evolving’ meaning and foreign law each yield potentially different results 
when factored into acts of legal reasoning. 
47 Whether conceived as a matter of principle or prudence, the ‘appearance of judicial 
impartiality’ involves an objective test.  However, it is difficult to base an objective 
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Similarly, there is no principled basis for criticising judges for articulating 
their theories of constitutional interpretation, however strongly those bear on 
the outcome of the particular cases before them.  Judges can hardly avoid 
choosing interpretative theories with which there is less than universal 
agreement if they are to render justice in accordance with legal prescriptions 
of any kind. 
 
Section B: The French Connection 
 
For a system of judicial review for constitutionality, in which the authority 
to pursue constitutional cases lay exclusively with the organs and officers of 
the state, we might leave our theoretical analysis there.  Such a system 
prevails in France,48 which, for present purposes, we will characterise as a 
system of ‘official’ review.49   However, in jurisdictions where parties may 
invoke the constitution to challenge the legality of their circumstances, a 
different scenario emerges.  There can only be contending parties to a 
constitutional dispute if one side believes that the law operates to protect their 
interest by frustrating the other’s interest and if that side has a right to the 
operation of constitutional law with regard to his own particular 
circumstances.  By contrast, under a system of official judicial review, the 
initiating officer or organ has no right to have the disputed provision 
interpreted with regard to his personal circumstances.   This is not for a 
moment to suggest that the officers in question have no personal interest in 
the operation of the law or that the operation they advocate would not work to 
protect their personal interests while frustrating those of another.   The 
process of ‘seizing’ France’s Constitutional Court is entirely political.  
Crucially, however, an initiating officer has no right to advert to the 
unconstitutional effect that the law would have on his personal circumstances 
– political or otherwise – as a reason for grounding the Conseil 
                                                                                                                               
finding of partiality on a forthright judicial lecture if we accept that, objectively, 
judges will have (and need) views on controversial constitutional issues which will 
affect how they decide the cases which come before them.  Even as a principle in 
itself, therefore, it seems that the appearance of impartiality would not be undercut by 
overt judicial moralising – impartiality being defined so as to exclude the differential 
impact such moralities exert on particular cases.  
48 According to article 61 of the French Constitution of 1958, prior to their 
promulgation, laws may be referred to the Conseil Constitutionnel for review of their 
constitutionality by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of 
the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, and sixty deputies or sixty 
senators. 
49 The usual English terminology here is ‘abstract’ review; this contrasts with the use 
of ‘concrete’ review in the common law world.  
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Constitutionnel’s judicial review.  The contending sides to official review act 
only in the context of their state offices.   As such, even though individual 
national legislators line up on either side of the legal question before the 
constitutional tribunal, the state, as legislator, is simply carrying out its 
processes of law making. Neither state itself nor its citizens are parties to a 
legal dispute. 
Whenever they initiate judicial review, French legislators act in their 
official capacity as such.  Through invoking the question of constitutional 
conformity, those minority parliamentarians who opposed the assembly 
passage of a bill are not simply engaging in a legal dispute with the ones in 
majority; both sides are using their constitutionally delegated powers to 
collectively make law.  A constitutional challenge to a bill by an assembly 
minority is simply a continuation of its lawmaking struggle with the majority. 
 Put differently, legislators invoking judicial review represent elements of the 
state’s law making apparatus, whose cohesion in a bill’s route to promulgation 
is assured by its Constitution.  This is not simply the theory; practically 
speaking, before the Conseil Constitutionnel, no delegation of deputies or 
head of government pleads how their personal constitutional rights will be 
compromised by the proposed law.50  Conversely, this is the very first thing a 
litigant will plead in a private constitutional challenge, à l’américaine.  In a 
system of official judicial review, a court applies constitutional law to 
prospective statutory law having regard to the impact each will have on the 
circumstances of the nation at large.  In a system of ‘unofficial’ judicial 
review, the court applies constitutional law to statutory law with regard also to 
the impact each will have on the circumstances of the individual litigant.51  In 
other words, a qualitatively different paradigm is at work where citizens or 
other private entities may constitutionally vindicate their personal interests 
against the state and one another: here we find two sides contesting not simply 
the constitutionality of a law, but the constitutionality of a law as it relates to 
them as legal actors. We shall characterise this model as a system of 
‘adversarial’ judicial review. 
Having pursued this theoretical excursion we now are in a position to 
address the question of judicial predispositions towards particular 
constitutional cases in systems of adversarial review.  If a party to a dispute 
exercises his right to have the constitution operate with regard to his personal 
circumstances (ie, if he litigates), an adjudicator cannot proceed without 
knowing the relationship between those circumstances and the constitution.  
Since a given party will hold the best, and possibly the only, information on 
                                                     
50 For a selection of recent Conseil Constitutionnel briefs and decisions see 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/divers/actu.htm 
51 In using the term ‘apply’ here, I do not mean to imply that the courts in either 
system would fail to engage in some law-making while discharging these functions.  
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his own circumstances, it would appear irrational for an adjudication to take 
place without a party’s input.  But a party’s right to have the constitution 
operate with regard to his circumstances bears more fundamental 
implications.52  First, that it is inappropriate for an adjudicator to deny a party 
the opportunity of having the law operate with respect to his circumstances by 
refusing to listen with an open mind to his account of those circumstances. 
 Thus, in Hamdan, one would expect the members of the US Supreme Court 
to listen to Hamdan’s account of the facts.  We have no reason to believe 
Justice Scalia failed do so.  The second implication is that an adjudicator 
ought to listen with an open mind to a party’s account of how the law at issue 
applies to his circumstances.  In the absence of an open mind regarding the 
application of law to the facts, even full knowledge of a party’s account of his 
circumstances will not allow a judge to discharge his duty in adversarial 
litigation.  So in Hamdan, the fact that Justice Scalia may have possessed 
full knowledge of Hamdan’s presentation of his circumstances did not relieve 
him of his duty to listen with an open mind to Hamdan’s legal arguments.  
Though the second implied judicial duty does not follow as obviously as the 
first, it is as much a component of an individualised approach to administering 
justice.53
Keeping an open mind towards a litigant’s legal argument is important for 
the proper administration of justice because it is only by way of their 
relationship to the law that the pertinence of a party’s circumstances becomes 
manifest.  Thus, the ‘fact’ that an accused party had a confession induced by 
torture is relevant to his subsequent trial only because it might violate what he 
                                                     
52 To clarify the use of the concept of ‘right’ in this context: a party has a right to ask 
a court to apply, say, article 9 of the UK Human Rights Act/ECHR on religious 
freedom to his circumstances, to wit, that he has been prohibited from wearing a 
turban in his workplace.  Evidently, our prospective litigant could not take such a case 
were he unable to mention his workplace and religious circumstances. Likewise, in 
applying article 9, a court could not simply ignore the litigant’s claim that he had been 
prohibited from wearing his turban, assuming the alleged prohibition went to the 
decisive legal issue(s).  In one sense, the ‘right’ in question is a practical concomitant 
of the possibility of non official parties participating in litigation.  The very point of 
such participation will be to bring law to bear on the circumstances of the participants.  
Nevertheless, the concept of right I have in mind is broader than this – it is also a 
norm of concern for an individualised administration of justice.  The right would thus 
apply outside the realm of purely constitutional adjudication. 
53 In terms of the role which the notion of individuality plays in conceptions of the 
administration of justice, note its addition to the following formula of judicial 
impartiality, ‘The reason [for the fundamental nature of the right to fair hearing by an 
impartial tribunal] is obvious. All legal arbiters are bound to apply the law as they 
understand it to the facts of individual cases as they find them’ Locabail (23) at 295 
(joint judgment of Bingham LCJ, Woolf  MR and Scott V-C).  
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says is a legal interest in constitutional due process.  A party cannot choose 
which of his many circumstances to present to a court for the purpose of 
having the law applied thereto without a theory of how the law makes them 
relevant.  A party would not know whether to mention his belief that he was 
tortured if he did not have a theory that he was entitled to due process and that 
due process proscribed the use of torture.  A party’s presentation of his 
circumstances is thus a product of his theory of how the law makes them 
relevant – or how it ought to.  Consequently, until a court tests a party’s legal 
theory it cannot make much claim to have applied the law specifically to the 
party’s circumstances since it cannot assess the party’s presentation of those 
circumstances.  For instance, until Justice Scalia listened to what Hamdan had 
to say about the Geneva Conventions, he would not be able to understand why 
the Petitioner mentioned that he was captured ‘on the field of battle in a war 
between the United States and the government of Afghanistan’; both of 
which, arguably, represented mutual signatories of the Geneva Conventions 
during the 2001 war against the Taliban’s Afghanistan.54  If he did not 
understand why Hamdan mentioned the facts he did, Justice Scalia would 
have been unable to assess Hamdan’s facts on their own terms, know how the 
presented facts purported to relate to each other, or know what non-presented 
facts he should ask Hamdan about.   Where a judge applies his theory of the 
law to a litigant’s facts (as Scalia did to Hamdan’s facts at his Swiss Q&A) 
without bothering with the litigant’s own theory of why those facts are legally 
relevant, he cannot claim to have diligently applied the law with regard to the 
litigant’s particular circumstances.  This is so because the judge would have 
failed to investigate the prima facie reason for the party’s appearance in his 
court – that, given his circumstances, the law is on his side.   
In short, a party’s presentation of his personal circumstances represents 
the court’s primary source of information about them; if an assessment of it is 
neglected, the court cannot be certain to have satisfied his right to have the 
constitution operate with regard to his circumstances.  Practically speaking, a 
failure to approach the parties’ legal arguments with an open mind would risk 
leaving a court shooting in the dark with respect to their circumstances.55  I 
                                                     
54 Brief for the Petitioner before the US Supreme Court, No 05-184 at 7. 
55 The point here is not that courts invariably follow the legal direction suggested by 
the parties’ arguments or that they should feel reluctant to decide cases sua sponte.  
Rather, the point is that it would be exceptional, and generally regarded as incorrect, 
for a court to decide a case sua sponte or otherwise without listening to counsel’s 
argument as to how it should be decided.  Having done so, the court is of course free 
to do whatever it thinks is best.  Conversely, ‘shooting in the dark’ is unproblematic 
in a system of official review since the court owes no duty to the persons of the 
initiating officers.  The court is at large with respect to how its decisions affect the 
particular circumstances of its referents, qua referents. 
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should emphasise that this concern regarding extrajudicial commentary does 
not apply where a judge’s thinking – however controversial – is framed in the 
abstract, without regard to upcoming cases.  Rather, our analysis pertains to 
judicial remarks which set out the law to be applied in a pending case.  Such 
commentary would indicate a close mindedness towards the case’s subject 
matter.  Given the implications of such an attitude for the individualised 
administration of justice in an adversarial system, remarks of that nature 
warrant a judge’s recusal.  The distinction between a judge’s dispositions in 
relation to a particular party’s prospects and his preferential attitudes to 
certain moral and policy positions is now readily apparent.  Moral preferences 
in genuinely hypothetical scenarios do not prejudice the realisation of any 
party’s right to the constitutional vindication of his particular circumstances 
since they do not compromise a judge’s ability to appreciate the legal theory 
explaining a party’s presentation of his circumstances.56  
  
Section C: The Dissenting Opinion 
 
The final element of the realist objection to the recognition of a principle 
of judicial open-mindedness lies in the operation of dissenting opinions.  In 
relation to capital punishment, one US Supreme Court Justice went so far as 
to declare in a dissent that, “[f]rom this day forward, I no longer shall tinker 
with the machinery of death.”57  Likewise, Justice Scalia expressed views 
similar to those he advocated in Switzerland in his dissent in Rasul v Bush.58  
                                                     
56 Note that there is no analogy between personal interest bias (at least of a pecuniary 
nature) and the normative preconceptions affecting judicial approaches to the 
determination of cases.  The latter are an essential element of appellate adjudication, 
the former are not. Cf Philip Bryden, ‘Legal Principles Governing the Disqualification 
of Judges’ 82 Canadian Bar Rev 3 (2003) at 555, 589, ‘if we must recognize that our 
law requires parties to take on faith to some extent the ability of our judges to be 
open-minded in deciding cases that require them to examine their own views and pre-
dispositions, there is a certain irony in our reluctance to require parties to accept the 
ability of judges to act impartially when relatively insignificant personal interests are 
at stake.’  In truth, there is no conflict between open-mindedness in deciding 
individual cases and the use of personal normative views in the making of those 
decisions.  If, having listened to a litigant’s presentation of their position, a judge 
makes a choice that is within the ambit of his normative discretion, we might well 
consider that choice normatively misguided.  Having applied his discretion equally to 
each party’s position, we cannot, however, regard the judge as partial.  Conversely, 
one may be as open-minded as Solomon as to whether one’s financial interest in the 
outcome of a case ought to affect that outcome, but one will remain nonetheless a 
judge in one’s own case. 
57 Callins v Collins, 510 US 1141(1994) (Blackmun J dissenting). 
58 Rasul v Bush 542 US 466 (2004). 
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By allowing minority judges to express their views as to the correct 
interpretation of the law (notwithstanding the majority’s definitive 
interpretation thereof) while not expecting them to adopt the majority’s 
version in future cases, we are recognising that judges have ideas as to what 
the law should be and that those ideas will affect how they dispose their future 
cases.  Thus, if we are going to permit judges to publish dissents, how can we 
coherently hold them to a standard of subject matter impartiality?  The first 
point to note is that if a judge were to extrajudicially articulate an abolitionist 
platform in apparent reference to a particular capital case he would open 
himself to the same charge of judicial partiality we have been canvassing in 
relation to Justice Scalia in Hamdan.  In terms of Blackmun’s dissent, it is 
arguable that the judge was not in fact construing the law with regard to 
particular capital cases but was instead setting out a general philosophy that 
was open to being countered by a state in any given case.59  But either way, it 
is perfectly possible for a judge to intend his opinion in case A, dissenting or 
otherwise, to rule his decision in case B, prior to having heard argument in the 
latter.   
In common with majority opinions, dissents are ex cathedra judicial 
statements.  They enjoy a place in the theories of authority adhered to in most 
adversarial legal systems – certainly that of the United States.  How often 
have we heard approving judicial reference to Murphy’s dissent in 
Korematsu,60 Holmes’ dissent in Lochner,61 Harlan’s dissent in Plessy?62  In 
the recent Lawrence v Texas63 decision, the Supreme Court overruled its 
decision of 17 years earlier, Bowers v Hardwick.64  In so doing, the Court 
59 See fn 27, ‘. . . I believe that the death penalty, as currently administered, is 
unconstitutional. Perhaps one day this Court will develop procedural rules or verbal 
formulas that actually will provide consistency, fairness, and reliability in a capital 
sentencing scheme.’ 
60 Korematsu v US  323 US 214 at 233 (1944) (Murphy J dissenting).  For Supreme 
Court majority opinions citing the dissent see for instance Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542 US 
507 at 535 (2004); Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena 515 US 200 at 215 (1995) and 
City of Richmond v J A. Croson Co 488 US 469 at 501 (1989). 
61 Lochner v New York 198 US 45 at 65 (1905) (Holmes J dissenting).  For Supreme 
Court majority opinion citations see for instance College Sav Bank v Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board 527 US 666 at 691 (1999); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey 505 US 833 at 861 (1992) and 
Rivera v Minnich 483 US 574 at 578 (1987). 
62 Plessy v Ferguson 163 US 537 at 552 (1896) (Harlan J dissenting).  For Supreme 
Court majority opinion citations see for instance Johnson v California 543 US 499 at 
513 (2005); Romer v Evans 517 US 620 at 623 (1996) and New York v US 505 US 144 at 
185 (1992). 
63 539 US 558 (2003). 
64 478 US 186 (1986). 
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quoted a passage from Justice Stevens’ Bowers dissent and held that “Justice 
Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and 
should control here.”  It is difficult to imagine the court drawing on a 
contemporaneous public lecture by Justice Stevens to make the same point.  
Conversely, it is easy to imagine Justice Scalia’s dissent in Rasul being cited 
in a future Supreme Court decision on the Executive’s war powers, whereas 
there would be no question of considering the citation of his substantively 
similar comments in Switzerland.  None of this is to say that dissenting 
opinions possess anything remotely like the degree of authority accorded to 
previous court decisions, simply that they possess some element of judicial 
authority.  In practice, dissents, like majority opinions, are taken to play a part 
in the doctrine of precedent, which in turn is taken to play a part in the 
jurisdiction’s theory of legal authority.  When judges hold forth in their bench 
opinions they are exercising an authority which the legal system has accorded 
them.  In majority, they are, in part, creating law.  In dissent, they are creating 
intimations of law which lie dormant, perhaps forever, but which both detract 
from the degree of authority accorded to the original decision65 and which 
facilitate a future judicial change of course.  As such, there is no analogy 
between off bench Q&A sessions and ex cathedra judicial pronouncements.  
The latter represent the legal authorities governing future cases (albeit to 
greatly differing degrees), the former represent the opinions of those who 
must yet determine, on an ad hoc basis, what the law should be in future 
cases.  Like majority opinions, dissenting opinions take on a systemic identity 
independent of their authors.  Once handed down, their authority would not be 
overridden by any contrary extrajudicial assertion their authors might make.  
Consequently, a dissenting opinion, even if intended by its author to apply to 
another, as yet unargued case, cannot be regarded as prejudicing the litigants 
of that future case since, once expressed, it is no longer a creature of that 
author’s intent.  By definition, litigants seek the justice provided by their legal 
system’s theory of authority, that is, they come to advance their interests by 
exercising their right to have the constitution applied to their particular 
circumstances.  The judicial operation of that theory of authority – the judicial 
citation of previous judicial opinions, including dissents – is what litigants 
have expressed an interest in obtaining.  Litigants cannot subsequently 
criticise the operation of that theory as partial because a judge cites his 
previous dissent.  Such citations represent a working element of the 
jurisdiction’s theory of authority; a theory the parties recognised by litigating 
on its terms.  By contrast, extrajudicial speeches constitute a non-authoritative 
65 It is rare for a court to omit the fact that the supporting precedent it is citing was a 
unanimous opinion.  The reason for this is evident – unanimity is deemed to increase, 
albeit only slightly, the authority of the citation. 
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vehicle for the expression of normative opinions.  As such, when directed at 
particular cases, the views they disclose may compromise the litigant’s 
prospects for a specific (ie, ad hoc) determination of the law with respect to 




Questions of subject matter prejudice can be problematic.  The 
maintenance of a consistent approach to such questions – at least those arising 
from acts of appellate adjudication – will be not realised in the absence of a 
clearly theorised account of the underlying need for judicial impartiality.  In 
practice, we would be likely to find ourselves criticising the non-recusal 
decisions of judges whose philosophies we find disagreeable while happily 
attending the lectures of those whose philosophies we admire.  The foregoing 
analysis suggests that a line may be drawn between a judge’s preconceptions 
concerning controversial matters relevant to a legal dispute before him and 
any preconception he might have regarding how those matters relate to that 
dispute.  Drawing the line in this fashion would preserve individualised 
judicial attention to litigants as an element in our theory of the proper 
administration of justice.  Taking this approach would recognise statutory 
recusal norms such as the US Code’s Section 455, or indeed the US 
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment,66 as coherent markers for judicial 
propriety within jurisdictions featuring judicial discretion and dissenting 
opinions.  We may thus conclude that Justice Scalia’s apparent contravention 
of these laws in his adjudication of Hamdan’s petition was an action which 
may not be excused on the ‘realist’ ground that, whatever the doctrinal 
position, appellate judges will inevitably have normative preconceptions 
going into any dispute. 
A question deserving of further consideration is the precise role of ‘the 
appearance of justice.’  The notion is widely employed as a test for recusal, 
and can be understood either as a normative end in itself67 or as a method of 
ensuring that as few as possible actually partial judgments occur.68  Perhaps 
the best characterisation of the ‘appearance of justice’ in the former role 
would be that the reasonable person has a right to be confident that her 
jurisdiction’s legal system operates impartially – in addition to any right to be 
                                                     
66 As interpreted in Re Murchison (n 25). 
67 A plausible interpretation of Hewart LCJ’s famous dictum that it ‘is of fundamental 
importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done.’ R. v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 
K.B. 256 at 259. 
68 See Ebner (n 23) para 7. 
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subject to a legal system which operates impartially.  However, given what we 
can expect the reasonable person to acknowledge regarding the quasi 
legislative nature of adjudication, it is unclear how abstract extrajudicial 
commentary could shake her confidence in judicial impartiality – even where 
the commentary concerns itself with controversial questions.69  Thus in 
practice, at least as regards subject matter prejudice, whether ‘reasonable 
appearance’ is recognised as an independent principle rather than simply an 
indispensable instrument for eliminating substantive partiality might not make 
very much difference. 
                                                     
69 Recall that we are merely addressing the issue of judicial impartiality; a perfectly 
impartial judge might use his discretion to bring immoral or misguided philosophies 
to bear on the cases before him. 
